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In the early 1980s I took two courses in Entomology at the University of Queensland.  The 
broad assumption then was that, although we could not be certain, insects probably did not 
experience pain.  The thinking was quasi-Cartesian: insects were automata where noxious or 
physically negative stimuli were concerned – programmed to recoil, certainly, but this recoil 
was purely reflexive and did not involve any physical, or obviously, psychological, pain.  In 1914 
Harry Weiss had tentatively raised the question of insect pain without ruling the possibility out; 
but not a great deal of scientific inquiry into the subject had been undertaken.  What work there 
was cast doubt on the possibility that insects might experience pain on anatomical, physiological 
and behavioural grounds.  These findings were usually associated – directly or indirectly, with a 
normative classificatory bias.  In the primary division between animals, the invertebrates, 
animals without backbones, were far simpler creatures than the vertebrates – i.e. with 
backbones.  The assumption of invertebrate simplicity thus consciously or unconsciously 
militated against the expectation of something as complex as pain experience (based on what was 
known about humans and some other mammals) in invertebrate groups such as those of the  
class Insecta. 
Although wary of lapsing into anthropomorphism, I was not entirely convinced.  I felt that even 
if insects did not experience pain as we did, they must still be aware of a radical ‘wrongness,’ a 
fundamental disorientation akin perhaps to human dementia, or a loss of an unselfconscious-
being-in-the world, only vaguely analogous to the way in which injury, old age, the threat of 
sudden annihilation precipitate our passage out of our everyday taken-for-granted being into a 
bodily awareness that is isolating and unpleasant in itself, even without accompanying pain.  But 
any experiment designed to test pain hypotheses in insects did, of course, involve inflicting pain 
on them should they in fact experience it – and this I was reluctant, as well as ill-equipped,  
to do. 
Even today, the physiological and psychological mechanisms of pain experience in humans 
remain enigmatic, so it is not surprising that even less was known about pain neurophysiology in 
either group in the 1980s.  Insect behaviours in the face of life threatening or what we would 
find as grotesquely painful injuries could often seem analogous with our own; but that 
assumption smacked of a misguided, if not deluded, anthropomorphism.  In support of the 
opposite view that relatively primitive neurophysiology in insects could not include pain 
reactions, scientists also turned to insect behaviours. 
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In 1984 C.H. Eisemann et al. published what would become over the next couple of decades, a 
very influential article on this question.  Though they concluded their findings with 
Wigglesworth’s1 caution that insect pain could not be entirely disproven, they attributed to 
insects ‘purely reflexive or "wired-in" responses’ with ‘largely pre-programmed behaviour 
patterns and limited learning capacity’(Eisemann et al.165).  Invertebrates in general they 
noted, had, relative to vertebrates, ‘fewer neurones’ and far less complex nervous systems 
(Eisemann et al.166).  Investigation of insect pharmacology had detected the presence of 
endogenous opioids (built-in pain ameliorators/suppressors) but opioids are associated with 
other functions in animal bodies, so their possession was by no means conclusive.  Qualified as it 
was, their conclusion that insects did not suffer pain drew primarily on behaviour. They noted 
that, for example: 
An insect walking with a crushed tarsus [limb]… will continue applying it to the 
substrate with undiminished force…  A locust continued to feed whilst being eaten by a 
mantis; a tse-tse fly which flew in to feed although half-dissected; caterpillars which 
continue to feed whilst tachinid larvae bore into them; many insects which go about 
their normal life [sic] while being eaten by internal parasitoids; and male mantis which 
continue to mate while they are being eaten by their partners (Eisemann et al.166). 
Eisemann et al. concluded that while such examples do not prove unequivocally that insects do 
not feel pain, they ‘strongly suggest that if a pain sense is present, it does not have any adaptive 
influence on behaviour’ and hence ‘insect neurobiology does not involve a "pain" sub-
programme’ (166). 
 
Much has changed since the early 1980s in both invertebrate and vertebrate pain research, with 
interest in the neurophysiology of the human brain (and human pain control) increasing 
                                                       
 
 
1. Wigglesworth, V.B. (1980) recommends that insects have their nervous systems inactivated 
before pain experiments are conducted on them, even though so far no proof of their 
experiencing pain has been found. 
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exponentially over the last twenty to thirty years.  There has also been increasing interest in the 
possibility of pain presence and its mechanisms in the Insecta, both in terms of direct curiosity 
about insects themselves, but also because of what we might learn about ourselves from 
experiments on them.  I turn to the particulars of a small sample of this research later in the 
paper, but it is first important to consider the social ‘background noise’ against which biological 
research takes place.  
Science gains its place as the primary interpreter of life in this world for us because of its 
adherence to the principles (and practice) of apparent objectivity.  Its current authority in the 
West and western-influenced countries derives from its unequivocal rejection of a subjective 
approach to matter and being.  For Biology and Zoology in particular, this has meant, at least 
until very recently, an outright rejection of anything that smacks of anthropomorphism.  Were 
we to judge animal form and behaviour by our own, science taught, we do non-human animals a 
disservice in failing to regard them (and thus understand them), as very different creatures; and 
secondly, and even more significantly, we would be likely to fall into gross errors in our 
conclusions, since their structures and modes of living are so radically different from our own.  
While regarding anthropomorphism, then, as anathema, science nevertheless takes place within 
human society. Further, the West is by no means alone in its assumption of anthropocentrism, 
that is, that humans are the apex of biological development and their interests – be they 
occupational, financial, survivalist – necessarily trump those of all other species.  (Arguments 
for the preservation of biodiversity, for instance, can often rely on our preference for a world of 
variation, and our still shamefully weak attempts to halt climate change ultimately privilege 
ourselves as well). 
While anthropocentrism is more or less unconsciously accepted in the societies out of which 
scientists work, anthropomorphism has usually been rejected. But the rise of ecological thinking 
and even evolutionary biology (with its constant reminder of our connections to other species in 
the recapitulation of phylogeny in our own ontogeny) suggest ways of conceiving the world 
which make anthropomorphism seem a less outrageous proposition, certainly in relation to 
other mammals.  Moreover, the unexpectedly high percentages of DNA all animals share also 
suggests that science may have been too quick to dismiss anthropomorphism at least if 
judiciously applied. 
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As ethics replaced religion in the West during the twentieth century as arbiter of rules governing 
human behaviour, various ironies in the relationships between humans and animals, ethics and 
animal experimentation and anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism have begun – or are 
beginning to – emerge.  These various shifts, broad as they are, have had a marked impact on the 
interest in and understanding of the nature and possibility of insect pain. 
Although objections to in vivo experiments on animals – including other primates and mammals 
- gained purchase only in the late nineteenth century, there had always been minority voices 
speaking against it.  Most of these experiments were not undertaken in the interests of the 
animals concerned but for the understanding and thus betterment of the human condition.  But 
there was always an unperceived or deliberately unacknowledged irony.  As the American 
Veterinary Association belatedly acknowledges, if we can use animals to tell us about ourselves, 
then the reverse must also hold true.  Or as philosopher Bernard Rollin puts the question 
slightly differently: 
One can well believe that only by thinking of animal pain in terms of Cartesian, 
mechanical processes devoid of an experiential, morally relevant dimension, could 
scientists have done the experimental work which has created the neurophysiology we 
have today.  But given that science, the neurophysiological analogies that have been 
discovered between humans and animals … are powerful arguments against the 
Cartesianism which made it possible.  In a dialectical irony which would have pleased 
Hegel, Cartesianism has been its own undoing by demonstrating more and more 
identical neurophysiological mechanisms in humans and animals, mechanisms which 
make it highly implausible that animals are machines if we are not (Rollin 86).  
Although Rollin is here referring to Vertebrates in particular, the irony to which he draws 
attention can potentially apply to Invertebrates.  As ethical constraints on live and/or 
unanaesthetised animal experimentation have been formalised as laws (at least in some 
countries), these constraints have also moved from Primates to mammals (with the exception, of 
those perpetual experimental victims, rats and mice) and even octopi – insects (and spiders) 
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have become experimental subjects.2  And just as the keeping of octopi for experimentation and 
the experiments themselves revealed human/octopus analogies, so too have insect/human 
analogies, particularly in the area of pain experience, gained increasing credence.  As we learn 
about human pain from crickets, spiders or fruit flies, we begin to credit the possibility that they 
too might indeed experience pain.  Insects are now the subject of neurophysiological, 
pharmacological, evolutionary and behavioural experiments designed either to reveal the nature 
of pain in general – in humans, or in the insects themselves. 
The physiological and psychological processes involved  in experiencing pain is one of the 
hardest subjects for science to tackle.  Pain has always been, and to a degree remains, enigmatic 
in humans, let alone in the Insecta.  The primary difficulty, of course, is that pain experience is 
not even species specific but is in fact personal and subjective.  This means that science, with its 
mantra of objectivity, seems ill-placed at the outset to investigate a subjective condition as 
fugitive as pain experience. Weiss, in his work published in 1914, was not the first scientist to 
raise the issue of potential pain in insects as well as the difficulties inherent in such inquiry, but 
he set out a number of pertinent questions:  ‘How does one distinguish between what is 
“painful” and what is “unpleasant” in our own species?  What constitutes a symptom of pain in 
Insects?  Who is qualified to judge?  Can we assume insects feel no pain because they exhibit no 
signs of suffering?’  After all, he notes, many humans who are suffering pain ‘go about their 
duties without exhibiting any signs of pain other than changes in facial expression’ (Weiss 270). 
One hundred years later, many of these questions remain unanswered, even for humans where 
we know that the combined effects of physical and psychological/emotional factors complicate 
the understanding and treatment of pain.  In insects it has proven difficult to distinguish between 
‘pain’ and what is termed ‘nociception’.  Martin Kavaliers (1988) quotes Sherrington (1906) in 
explaining the term ‘nociception’.  It is characteristic of all animals to respond to negative 
stimuli, and ‘this capability of animals to detect and react to stimuli that may compromise their 
                                                       
 
 
2. Spiders are not insects as such, but they are often considered so closely aligned as to shed equal 
light on insect behaviour, neurotransmission 2etc. 
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integrity is embodied in the term “nociception”.’  But aversive reactions to such noxious stimuli 
may be purely reflexive or, alternatively, conscious, with the latter implying the potential or 
actuality of pain feelings, while the former – the reflexive – does not.  Thus the simple presence 
of nociceptors and/or nociceptor-responsive behaviours does not necessarily involve pain 
sensations.  As Kavaliers also explains, it is difficult for human observers to interpret animal 
behaviours objectively.  ‘Descriptions of postures, movements and vocalisations that are 
associated with nociception can be quantitative and objective, but interpretations . . . are in 
words with connotations of human experience’ (emphasis added).  He cautions that ‘too often 
scientists working with non-human animals considered ‘nociception’ and ‘pain’ as equivalent’ 
(Kavaliers 923).  Quoting Merskey’s definition of pain as ‘an unpleasant sensory and emotional 
experience associated with either actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of 
such’, Kavaliers distinguishes it from the nociceptive behaviours of all animals, primarily, it 
would seem, through its emotional component and thus the question of insect consciousness. 
Few investigators today– whether scientists or philosophers –would argue against pain 
experience in mammals or vertebrates more generally.  And although in-vivo eye/brain 
experiments continue on Cephalopods in many countries, most researchers would be wary of 
ruling out pain experience – even including its conscious component – in the invertebrate 
octopus.  Kavaliers quotes the Eisemann article as a reasonably authoritative one, but he does 
note, citing Bodman (1986), that ‘some insects have been proposed to display hormonally-
mediated responses to stressful environmental conditions; responses which, in certain respects, 
appear similar to the hormonally-mediated stress responses in mammals’ (Kavaliers 925).  These 
hormonal responses would certainly indicate a complex neurophysiological pathway from 
nociceptor to nerve centre to catalysing hormonal secretions, but would again not necessarily 
provide firm evidence of pain.  It might, however, be indicative, in its similarity to human 
hormones, of an evolutionary continuation (across the vertebrate/invertebrate ‘divide’) of 
mechanisms – chemical as well as neurophysiological – that might include pain registration as a 
response to injurious stimuli.  Thomas Eisner & Scott Camazine’s work (1983) on spider leg 
autotomy (the shedding of a limb to avoid more lethal damage) in Argiope spp. is also of interest 
here, since ‘the sensing mechanisms whereby spiders detect harmful venom’ – injected by prey 
– ‘may be fundamentally similar to the mechanisms in humans that are coupled with the 
perception of pain’ (Eisner and Camazine 25).  
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But such suggestive findings remained inconclusive, failing to rule out the possibility of pain, but 
not unequivocally demonstrating its presence either.  Over the next thirty years different 
approaches were adopted, some directly concerned with pain in insects, but many more 
investigating the nature of pain in general, particularly as this might be useful in its application to 
humans.  Hari Manev and Nikola Dimitrijevic (2005) explain why insects have become so 
important to pain researchers: 
Because pain can predict tissue damage by noxious stimuli it appears to be a sensation 
common to complex living systems.  Furthermore, it appears that different species use 
common mechanisms of temperature and pain sensation or perception.  Because 
reducing pain is a human activity that typically requires pharmacological interventions, 
in-vivo experimentation appears to be the only methodology that can lead to successful 
discovery of new analgesics.  This type of research is bound by ethical concerns and 
most commonly relies on in-vivo mammalian models (de Bars et al 2001).  However, 
no serious ethical controversies have arisen regarding in-vivo experiments on insects. 
Thus it appears that for the time being a Drosophila [fruit fly] model for screening putative 
analgesics and characterisation of antinoceptive mechanisms and novel drug targets would be 
advantageous (Manev and Dimitrijevic 2404). 
From this, one can see that the literature on the ethics of animal experimentation has itself 
burgeoned in philosophical and animal welfare circles, though only very recently bringing with it 
any ethical questions about insects and insect pain.  Interestingly, Manev & Dimitrijevic, 
summarising previous work on Drosophila in terms of memory and learning conclude that: 
‘These studies clearly point out the complexity of Drosophila behaviour and suggest that [fruit] 
flies are sufficiently complex organisms and can be used in pain research’ (2406).  As far as other 
scientists were concerned, however, a broad claim of insect ‘complexity’ did not necessarily 
imply insect pain. Many scientists certainly continued, through the 1990s, to disagree with its 
presence and/or likelihood. 
In their attempts to apply objective methodologies and to assess results objectively, scientists 
sought proof in a number of ways:  First, the presence (or lack thereof), of endogenous opioids 
in insects together with exogenous opioid experimentation with morphine (as pain 
ameliorator/suppressor and nociceptor inhibitor) i.e. the antinociceptor effect; second, 
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neurological complexity in terms of both ganglionic and brain function demonstrated through 
learning and memory experiments especially as applied to nociception and the vexed question of 
the nature of consciousness; and third, evolutionary continuation of hormonal and molecular 
responses across the vertebrate/invertebrate divide. 
Drosophila melanogaster has long been an experimental favourite in genetic research.  Its 
recruitment to pain studies is relatively recent but has obviously been facilitated by its long 
history as an experimental subject.  In order to determine ‘a pain condition in animals, in 
addition to a response to … noxious stimuli e.g. heat, one has to demonstrate the capacity of an 
antinociceptive procedure treatment that can attenuate this response’(emphasis added, (Manev 
and Dimitrijevic).  In 2003 Daniel Tracey et al. isolated a mutant gene in Drosophila (which 
they rather confusingly dubbed ‘painless’) that could be used to demonstrate antinociceptive 
responses consistent with pain experience in Drosophila and Drosophila larvae.  Their interest 
was in broader pain investigation, with their results published in Cell.  Zabala and Gomez 
(1991) had already used the cricket (Pteronemobius sp) to test morphine analgesia, tolerance 
and addiction in insects.  The presence of endogenous opioids in insects had already been 
demonstrated but since opioids can have a number of functions aside from pain amelioration, 
their particular effect as a pain suppressor in insects remained unproven.  However, ‘the same 
antinociceptive behavioural effects’ as those reported in vertebrates, had already also been 
observed in some invertebrates … ‘like the honey bee, praying mantis and crickets’ (Zabala and 
Gomez).  Zabala and Gomez used a previously untried methodology to effectively demonstrate 
pain suppression through morphine analgesia in Pteronemoibus.  Continuing work on the role of 
endogenous opiods, V.E. Dyakonova (2001) pursued a more evolutionary approach, arguing 
that ‘comparative data indicate that the most conservative and ancient function of opioids is 
control of an adequate level of protective reactions’ (Dyakonova 253) and that other functions 
have been added in the course of evolution, such as ‘stress-induced analgesia, regulation of 
feeding and mating behaviour and aggression’.  They further suggested that ‘the main events in 
the formation of functions of the endogenous opioid system occurred in the lower 
invertebrates’, though ‘these had been the least studied’ (Dyakonova 253). 
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Focussing on pain in insects per se, Ayse Yarali et al. in Animal Behaviour (2008) again used 
Drosophila in experiments in pain relief learning – using odours before and after electric shock – 
to demonstrate that Drosophila experienced pain and ‘that "relief learning" showed that in 
terms of psychological [my italics] mechanisms it established genuinely associative conditioned 
approach behaviour’ (Yarali et al. 1173).  Gregory Neely et al. (2011) – again using thermal 
nociception in Drosophila – isolated a gene, ‘TrpA1’ as a ‘bona fide "pain" gene in both adult 
and larval fly nociception paradigms’.  All genes require expression in animal bodies and Neely’s 
group were able to demonstrate ‘its expression within the Drosophila nervous system, 
specifically within multi-dendritic (md) sensory neurones’.  Therefore, they concluded, ‘our 
analysis identifies the channel TRPA1 as a conserved regulator of nociception’.  Both 
endogenous opioid presence and morphine-induced analgesia thus seemed to demonstrate, for 
many scientists, pain experience in insects who, it seemed evinced responses to analgesic effects 
not unlike our own.  But many scientists still felt that a presumed lack of consciousness in the 
Insecta necessarily militated against this possibility.  Text books are by definition more 
conservative than investigative research, and in Neuroscience – From Molecule to Behaviour 
(2013) published by the reputable Verlag Press in Heidelberg, Maria P. Abbracchio and Angelo 
M. Reggiani concluded that in addition to humans, ‘the only animals capable of feeling pain are 
those that can feel emotions such as fear, anxiety, distress’ (445).  All vertebrates show ‘typical 
signs of pain’ while ‘the balance of evidence suggests that most invertebrates do not’.  For 
Abbracchio and Reggiani the capacity to experience emotion is inseparable from the experience 
of pain, and ‘only the brain recognises and gives "meaning" to the pain messages, while the 
"mind" evaluates how bad the pain is’ (Abbracchio and Reggiani 446).  Invertebrates as a whole, 
for these researchers, thus lacked the brain capacity/complexity to both experience emotion and 
evaluate injury. 
Brain/neurological complexity in invertebrates as a whole and the Insecta in particular is at issue 
here.  But well before 2013, a number of scientists had identified various cognitive and often 
complex abilities and behaviours in insects.  Though cognition and consciousness are not 
considered identical, they have been closely related in terms of the investigation of insect 
neurophysiology.  But ‘identifying hallmarks of consciousness’ is, as David B. Edelman et al. 
(2004) point out, a particularly difficult task in non-mammalian species.  ‘More creative means’, 
they suggest, ‘must be developed for eliciting behaviours consistent with consciousness’. 
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Strategies available for  ‘amassing evidence for consciousness in non-human species include 
searching for evolutionary homologies in anatomical substrates and measurement and 
physiological correlates of conscious states’ (Edelman et al. 180).  The potential for evolutionary 
development/continuity across the vertebrate/invertebrate divide is an interesting one and one 
raised not only by the neurobiologists, but, as noted above, in opioid/analgesic studies as well. 
For Abbracchio and Reggiani in their 2013 textbook, vertebrate/invertebrate classification still 
tended to dominate thinking about the Insecta, coupled, as always, with conscious or 
unconscious assumptions about complexity (us and our relatives) and simplicity – the Insecta.  A 
2014 textbook specifically on insects, however, while leaving the question of pain experience 
open, notes that ‘insect behaviour can be complex, involving integration of neural information 
within the ganglia’ and that ‘insect neurones release a variety of chemicals at synapses to both 
stimulate or inhibit effector neurones or muscles.  Important neurotransmitters include 
acetylcholine … and dopamine as in vertebrates’ (Gullan 64). 
Animal welfare proponents and philosophers have also been aware, of course, of the difficulties 
of proving unequivocally that insects experience pain sensations comparable to ours.  As Jane A. 
Smith (1991) states, ‘the further we move away from the mammalian plan, the more difficult it 
becomes to infer pain in other species’ (Smith 25).  There are, she notes, no ‘easy answers’ to 
the difficult question of assessing pain in invertebrates given its ‘subjective nature’ and it is 
unlikely ‘that any clear cut definitive criteria will ever be found to decide the question’.  C.M. 
Sherwin in Animal Welfare (2001) investigates, from a philosophical perspective, the robustness 
– or otherwise – of ‘argument by analogy’.  Because suffering is a ‘negative mental state – a 
private experience – …it cannot be measured directly’.  Although we may now know that 
‘invertebrates such as cockroaches, flies and slugs have short and long-term memory’ it does not 
prove they suffer pain although ‘invertebrates openly behave in a strikingly analogous manner to 
vertebrates’ and therefore ‘the similarity of these responses may indicate a level of consciousness 
not normally attributed to invertebrates’.  For Sherwin this indicates that ‘we should either be 
more cautious when using argument by analogy or remain open minded to the possibility that 
invertebrates are capable of suffering in a similar way to vertebrates’ (Sherwin 115). 
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Jennifer Mather approaches the subject through both a history of standard animal classifications 
– those which, like the Scala Naturae or the vertebrate/invertebrate distinction imply 
judgements of simplicity and complexity.  Classification itself also tends to emphasise differences 
rather than similarities, competition rather than cooperation.  Mather also gives a summary of 
the standard philosophical  approaches to human – nonhuman animal relations from the 
contractarian to rights based perspectives.  In conclusion, she writes: 
Although theorists have not necessarily thought specifically of invertebrates in 
postulating humans’ attitudes towards animals, human attitudes are important to the 
welfare of these (and all) animals. Contractarian theorists value our humanness in caring 
about animals, utilitarians consider the importance of the 99% of animals that 
invertebrates represent, and rights theorists’ concentration on animals’ essential needs is 
useful/or enriching the everyday lives of invertebrates (Mather 211). 
In a 2015 article Mather argues for the extension of our ‘anthropocentric’ consideration for the 
welfare of mammals (and other vertebrates) to the invertebrates.  A ‘morality of care’ rather 
than one of rights, and ‘the damage humans do to themselves by cruel treatment of animals both 
argue for the extension of consideration to all animal species’ (Mather 211). 
Robert Elwood (2011) in ILAR Journal summarises previous scientific work on invertebrate 
pain, focussing, in contrast to Mather (who appears to conflate pain and nociception) on the 
differences between pain and nociception.  Using criteria similar but not identical to those 
scientists had explored in the last three decades, he concludes his article by stating that: 
Braithwaite (2010) was confident enough to state that fish feel pain but invertebrates do 
not.  I do not share the confidence to make that discrimination.  Neither do I feel 
confident in stating unequivocally that some of them do feel pain, although it is clear 
that the responses described above cannot be explained just by nociceptive reflexes. 
While awaiting the results of further relevant studies, perhaps all who use invertebrates 
should consider the possibility that at least some might suffer pain and as a precaution, 
ensure humane care of these animals (Elwood 182). 
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Given that Elwood’s account is perhaps the most comprehensive on scientific findings to 2011, 
it is particularly interesting to note that having considered experimental work over the last forty 
years in relation to:  suitable receptors; a suitable central nervous system; responsiveness to 
opioids, analgesics and anaesthetics; protective motor reactions; tradeoffs between stimulus 
avoidance and other activities; and cognitive ability and sentience, he comes to the conclusion – 
so focal in Eisemann et al.’s influential 1980s paper – that behaviour provides the greatest 
insights into likely experience of pain (Eisemann et al.182).  Moreover, the inconclusive nature 
of the sum of the results to 2011, and the caution that we should apply humane treatment in our 
dealings with insects – since pain remains neither proven nor disproven – also seems to take us 
back to Weiss’s questions at the beginning of the twentieth century.  But while the accumulated 
findings of the last thirty or forty years may not have produced scientific proof of pain 
experience in the Insecta, it has nevertheless provided a solid foundation for the groundbreaking 
2016 results of insect neurobiologist Andrew Barron and philosopher Colin Klein. 
It is perhaps no accident that the most fruitful research to date on this topic has been produced 
not by scientists or philosophers alone but in the conjunction between the two disciplines.  
Addressing the issue of insect consciousness, Barron and Klein argue, in Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, that structures in the insect brain function similarly to the human 
midbrain, an area understood to be focal in subjective experience in humans where 
consciousness is thought to emerge.  Drawing on existing research in insect intelligence and 
learning, Barron and Klein write that ‘insect behaviour involves multiple layers of filtering of 
sensory information to support selective attention to stimuli that are salient and suppression of 
representation of irrelevant stimuli’. 
It would have seemed unlikely in the 1980s that research on insect pain per se would have found 
its way into the popular press.  And although Barron and Klein do mention a potential for 
human application their stress is on insects themselves.  Both the New York Times (April 19, 
2016) and the Sydney Morning Herald (April 24, 2016) published accounts of the findings.  
Klein told the papers that ‘one of the things we are interested in is consciousness, and why 
consciousness might have evolved in the first place. What is really important about the origin of 
consciousness in this account is that it arises from integrating functions – taking together sensory 
information, the state of the body, memories of where the organism has been and putting these 
together into a single point of view that allows navigation in a complicated world. 
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Consciousness, they claim, may be very ancient, perhaps emerging in the Cambrian period  
(500 million years ago) – rather than something which evolved only in humans and the  
‘higher’ vertebrates. 
Writing of Klein and Barron’s findings in the New York Times, James Gorman concludes that: 
Thus if consciousness is widespread through the animal kingdom ethical questions about 
how we treat even tiny household pests becomes a bit more complicated.  It’s long been 
recognised that there’s a huge moral difference between slaughtering a lamb quickly and 
letting it die slowly even if in both cases the intention is to barbecue its meaty bits…. 
Does the same distinction thus apply between a cockroach stomped on, and one left to 
expire over time, fearful and pain-racked by pesticide?  What of Louie’s [the fly in the 
Mortein ad] cousin helplessly glued to fly paper, struggling until thirst and exhaustion 
take their fatal toll?  He might be in trauma, but equally, Klein suggests, he may be in 
‘dim confusion’. 
Barron and Klein’s neurophysiological findings on the insect brain and its implications for 
consciousness in animals as a whole, together with earlier evidence such as opioid/analgesic 
responses, the presence of stress-related hormones in insects, evolutionary continuities across 
vertebrates and invertebrates and learning and memory – would seem to indeed argue for the 
presence of pain or something very closely related to it, in insects.  These conclusions, and the 
manner of their dissemination are significant.  Reported in both a reputable scientific 
publication, and in the popular press, these findings – though no doubt able to be used to 
elucidate the nature of consciousness in Homo sapiens – are expressed in terms of their 
significance for insects, and even more importantly, our treatment of them. 
It is worth returning to the questions raised by Weiss in 1914: ‘How does one distinguish 
between what is "painful" and what is "unpleasant"? …. What constitutes a symptom of pain in 
insects?’ and perhaps, his most interesting question of all, ‘who is qualified to judge?’  While 
science continues – and indeed needs to continue – its objective investigation of the natural 
world, it is worth noting that the question of insect pain, illuminated by scientific advances, took 
many a detour through anthropocentric experiments along the way.  In the end, however, a 
philosopher and a neurobiologist arrived at the most significant discovery – consciousness in  
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insects – and therefore the likelihood of pain and suffering with a basis in anthropomorphic 
intuition: ‘I do have the instinct that fly paper seems more cruel than swatting’, Klein says ‘even 
if it’s more convenient for us.  I think if you’re governed by the idea that it’s just a fly or just a 
bee, so it doesn’t matter, then it’s probably worth rethinking’. 
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